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British Colonial Institutions and Economic Development in India

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  • Shilpi Kapur
  • Sukkoo Kim

Abstract

We explore the impact of British colonial institutions on the economic development of India. In some regions, the British colonial government assigned property rights in land and taxes to landlords whereas in others it assigned them directly to cultivators or non-landlords. Although Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that agricultural productivity of non-landlord areas diverged and out-performed relative to landlord areas after 1965 with the advent of the Green Revolution, we find evidence of superior economic performance of non-landlord regions in both the pre- and the post-independence periods. We believe that landlord and non-landlord regions diverged because their differing property rights institutions led to differences in incentives for development.

Suggested Citation

  • Shilpi Kapur & Sukkoo Kim, 2006. "British Colonial Institutions and Economic Development in India," NBER Working Papers 12613, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12613
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tanika Chakraborty & Sukkoo Kim, 2008. "Caste, Kinship and Sex Ratios in India," NBER Working Papers 13828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Tirthankar Roy, 2014. "The Rise and Fall of Indian Economic History 1920-2013," Economic History of Developing Regions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(1), pages 15-41, June.
    3. Tanika Chakraborty & Sukkoo Kim, 2010. "Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 47(4), pages 989-1012, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights

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