Specific Investments and Ownership Structures in Railways – An Experimental Analysis
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Cited by:
- Benjamin Pakula & Georg Götz, 2011. "Organisational Structures in Network Industries – An Application to the Railway Industry," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201109, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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More about this item
Keywords
game theory; vertical separation; railways; experimental economics;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2009-12-11 (Experimental Economics)
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