Incomplete Contracting: A Laboratory Experimental Analysis
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- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011.
"Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
- Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2009. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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"Bounded Rationality as an Essential Component of the Holdup Problem,"
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0009, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
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- Wichardt, Philipp C. & Schunk, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009.
"Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining,"
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 33-35, April.
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- repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:706-725 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017.
"The management of innovation: Experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 706-725.
- Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2005. "Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 223-242.
- Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2016. "Equity and bargaining power in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 144-165.
- Randolph Sloof, 2003. "Price-setting Power versus Private Information," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-099/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- L. Bagnoli & G. Negroni, 2012. "On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies," Working Papers wp858, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Agnes Bäker & Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler, 2014. "Entitlement and the efficiency-equality trade-off: an experimental study," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(2), pages 225-240, February.
- Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 13204, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vital Anderhub & Simon Gächter & Manfred Königstein, 2002.
"Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 5-27, June.
- Vital Anderhub & Simon Gaechter & Manfred Koenigstein, "undated". "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 018, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Anderhub, Vital & Gächter, Simon & Königstein, Manfred, 1999. "Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,82, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2004. "Relying on a man's word?: An experimental study on non-binding contracts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 299-332, September.
- Arshad Ali Javed & Patrick T.I. Lam & Albert P.C. Chan, 2014. "Change negotiation in public-private partnership projects through output specifications: an experimental approach based on game theory," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 323-348, April.
- Thomas Ehrmann & Karl-Hans Hartwig & Torsten Marner & Hendrik Schmale, 2009. "Specific Investments and Ownership Structures in Railways – An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 12, Institute of Transport Economics, University of Muenster.
- Mathias Erlei & J. Philipp Siemer, 2014.
"Endogenous Property Rights in a Hold-up Experiment,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 237-270, May.
- Mathias Erlei & Philipp Siemer, 2004. "Endogenous Property Rights in a Hold up-Experiment," TUC Working Papers in Economics 0002, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
- Sloof, Randolph, 2008. "Price-setting power vs. private information: An experimental evaluation of their impact on holdup," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 469-486, April.
- repec:spr:jeicoo:v:12:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11403-016-0180-1 is not listed on IDEAS
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