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What is the contribution of the theory of redistribution systems to the theory of corruption?


  • Milan Palat

    () (Department of Territorial Studies, Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies, Mendel University in Brno)

  • Petr Wawrosz

    () (Faculty of Economic Studies, The University of Finance and Administration)

  • Tomas Otahal

    () (Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno)


Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behavior and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part - the theory of parallel redistribution games.

Suggested Citation

  • Milan Palat & Petr Wawrosz & Tomas Otahal, 2012. "What is the contribution of the theory of redistribution systems to the theory of corruption?," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2012-25, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:men:wpaper:25_2012

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    Corruption; redistribution system; parallel redistribution game; game theory;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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