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What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?

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  • Otáhal Tomáš

    () (Department of Economics, FBE MENDELU in Brno, Zemědělská 1, 613 00 Brno, Czech Republic)

  • Palát Milan

    () (Department of Territorial Studies, Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies, Mendel University in Brno, Zemědělská 1, 613 00 Brno, Czech Republic)

  • Wawrosz Petr

    () (The University of Finance and Administration, Faculty of Economic Studies, Estonská 500, 101 00 Prague 10)

Abstract

Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems to account for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, and explain the importance of agents for survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent’s environment (system) and their significance for survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behaviour and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part - the theory of parallel redistribution games.

Suggested Citation

  • Otáhal Tomáš & Palát Milan & Wawrosz Petr, 2013. "What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?," Review of Economic Perspectives, Sciendo, vol. 13(2), pages 92-107, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:vrs:reoecp:v:13:y:2013:i:2:p:92-107:n:3
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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