Incentives and Superstars on the LPGA Tour
Following Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a, b), this paper explores the role of incentives on the 2000 LPGA Tour. Overall, it finds them to have limited effectiveness. Several possible explanations are considered, including unmeasured differences in both abilities and courses and variations in the distribution of prizes across tournaments. The existence of a “superstar effect” is also considered.
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- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990.
"Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-24, December.
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "The Economics of Superstars," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 845-58, December.
- repec:sae:ilrrev:v:43:y:1990:i:3:p:74-88 is not listed on IDEAS
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
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