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Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments

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  • Alexander Matros

Abstract

We consider two-round elimination tournaments where players have fixed resources instead of cost functions. Two approaches are suggested. If the players have the same resources and a success function is stochastic, then players always spend more resources in the first than in the second round in a symmetric equilibrium. Equal resource allocation between two rounds takes place only in the winner-take-all case. However, if the players have independent private resources and the success function is deterministic, then every player spends at least one third of his resources in the first round. The players spend exactly one third of their resources in the winner-take-all case. Applications for career paths, elections, and sports are discussed

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Matros, 2004. "Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 295, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:295
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
    3. Onsong Shin & Michael R. Baye, 1999. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 691-693, June.
    4. Avinash Dixit, 1999. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 694-694, June.
    5. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    6. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-1324, December.
    7. Baik, Kyung H & Shogren, Jason F, 1992. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 359-362, March.
    8. Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "The Economics of Superstars," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 845-858, December.
    9. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December.
    10. Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-179, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction
      [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tournaments; auctions;

    JEL classification:

    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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