IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Optimal Taxation and Growth with Public Goods and Costly Enforcement

  • Pierre-Richard Agénor
  • Kyriakos C. Neanidis

This paper studies optimal direct and indirect taxation in an endogenous growth framework with a productive public good and costly tax collection. Optimal (growth-maximizing) tax rules are derived under exogenous collection costs. The optimal direct-indirect tax ratio is shown to be negatively related to the administrative costs of collecting these taxes, as documented in cross-country data. This result also holds under endogenous collection costs (with these costs inversely related to administrative spending on tax enforcement), but for these to generate significant effects on tax collection requires implausibly high degrees of efficiency in spending, or the allocation of a large fraction of resources to tax enforcement. Depending on how it is financed, the latter policy may entail adverse effects on growth. Improving "tax culture" and the sense of civic duty through greater budgetary transparency may be a more effective policy to improve tax collection and promote economic growth.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester in its series Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series with number 89.

in new window

Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:89
Contact details of provider: Postal: Manchester M13 9PL
Phone: (0)161 275 4868
Fax: (0)161 275 4812
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Ingrid Ott & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2005. "Excludable and Non-excludable Public Inputs: Consequences for Economic Growth," Working Paper Series in Economics 2, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
  2. Roger Gordon & Wei Li, 2005. "Tax Structure in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation," NBER Working Papers 11267, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "Optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 221-236, November.
  4. Judd, Kenneth L., 1985. "Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 59-83, October.
  5. Reinhart, Carmen & Ogaki, Masao & Ostry, Jonathan, 1995. "Saving behavior in low- and middle-income developing countries," MPRA Paper 13757, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1998. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy," Staff Report 251, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  7. Barro, R.J., 1988. "Government Spending In A Simple Model Of Endogenous Growth," RCER Working Papers 130, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  8. Turnovsky, Stephen J., 2000. "Fiscal policy, elastic labor supply, and endogenous growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 185-210, February.
  9. Garcia Penalosa, Cecilia & Turnovsky, Stephen J., 2005. "Second-best optimal taxation of capital and labor in a developing economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 1045-1074, June.
  10. Ortigueira, Salvador, 1998. "Fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 323-355, July.
  11. Pierre Richard Agénor & Kyriakos C. Neanidis, 2006. "The Allocation of Public Expenditure and Economic Growth," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0608, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  12. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, 2014. "Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 625-683, November.
  13. Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April.
  14. Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro, 1999. "Inflationary financing of public investment and economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 539-563, February.
  15. Pecorino, Paul, 1993. "Tax structure and growth in a model with human capital," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 251-271, September.
  16. Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-22, May.
  17. De Fiore, Fiorella, 2000. "The optimal inflation tax when taxes are costly to collect," Working Paper Series 0038, European Central Bank.
  18. Bird, Richard M. & Zolt, Eric M., 2005. "The limited role of the personal income tax in developing countries," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 928-946, December.
  19. repec:ttp:itpwps:0508 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Juin-jen Chang & Jhy-hwa Chen & Jhy-yuan Shieh, 2012. "Consumption externalities, market imperfections and optimal taxation," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 8(4), pages 345-359, December.
  21. Holman, Jill A. & Neanidis, Kyriakos C., 2006. "Financing government expenditures in an open economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(8), pages 1315-1337, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:89. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marianne Sensier)

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Marianne Sensier to update the entry or send us the correct address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.