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The optimal inflation tax when taxes are costly to collect

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  • De Fiore, Fiorella

Abstract

Tax collection costs have been advocated in the literature as a reason to deviate from the Friedman rule, in standard general equilibrium monetary models with flexible prices. This paper shows that there are conditions under which the Friedman rule is optimal despite the presence of collection costs. When these conditions are not satisfied, the optimal inflation tax depends upon the collection costs parameter and schedule, the interest and scale elasticity of money demand, and the compensated labor supply elasticity. Numerical results obtained by calibrating the model on US data suggest that collection costs do not justify substantial departures from Friedman's prescriptions. JEL Classification: E31, E41, E58, E62

Suggested Citation

  • De Fiore, Fiorella, 2000. "The optimal inflation tax when taxes are costly to collect," Working Paper Series 38, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:200038
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    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp038.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tomat, Gian Maria, 2002. "Durable goods, price indexes and quality change: an application to automobile prices in Italy, 1988-1998," Working Paper Series 0118, European Central Bank.
    2. Camba-Méndez, Gonzalo & Garcí­a, Juan Angel & Rodriguez-Palenzuela, Diego, 2003. "Relevant economic issues concerning the optimal rate of inflation," Working Paper Series 278, European Central Bank.
    3. Arbex, Marcelo & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2011. "Optimal monetary and audit policy with imperfect taxation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 327-340, June.
    4. Klaeffling, Matt & López Pérez, Víctor, 2003. "Inflation targets and the liquidity trap," Working Paper Series 272, European Central Bank.
    5. Matt Klaeffling & Víctor López Pérez, 2003. "Inflation Targets and the Liquidity Trap," Working Papers wp2003_0309, CEMFI.
    6. De Fiore, Fiorella, 2000. "Can indeterminacy explain the short-run non-neutrality of money?," Working Paper Series 0032, European Central Bank.
    7. Bernardino Adão, 2019. "Why is price stability a key goal of central banks?," Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles and Banco de Portugal Economic Studies, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    8. Pinar Yesin, 2004. "Tax Collection Costs, Tax Evasion and Optimal Interest Rates," Working Papers 04.02, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    9. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Kyriakos C. Neanidis, 2014. "Optimal taxation and growth with public goods and costly enforcement," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 425-454, June.
    10. Arbex, Marcelo & Villamil, Anne P., 2009. "On the Optimality of the Friedman Rule with Costly Tax Enforcement," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 7-30.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    collection costs; Friedman rule; optimal inflation tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E41 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Demand for Money
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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