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Learning from the Swiss corporate governance exception

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  • Massimiliano Vatiero

    () (Institute of Law (IDUSI), and Institute of Economics (IdEP), Facoltà di Economia, Università della Svizzera italiana, Svizzera)

Abstract

The Swiss economy represents an exception to the legal origin theory (e.g., Roe (2006)). Although Switzerland is a country belonging to the civil law family, many of its public companies have diffused corporate ownership, as do those in common law countries. This paper maintains that the Swiss exception relies on the complementarity between corporate ownership and policies addressing employment protection and innovation. The Swiss case presents two lessons: first, the current corporate governance is the result of a long and composite path in which politics plays a pivotal role; second, the institutional differences and similarities across countries, which one would try to explain along with the legal origin theory, can derive diversely from additional politics-based accounts, such as those referring to policies on employment protection and innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimiliano Vatiero, 2016. "Learning from the Swiss corporate governance exception," IdEP Economic Papers 1606, USI Università della Svizzera italiana.
  • Handle: RePEc:lug:wpidep:1606
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Belloc, Filippo, 2019. "Institutional complementarities between labour laws and innovation," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(02), pages 235-258, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance and ownership; innovation; employment protection; institutional complementarity; Swiss economy;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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