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The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Kraakman, Reinier

    (Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law, Harvard Law School)

  • Armour, John

    (Lovells Professor of Law and Finance , University of Oxford)

  • Davies, Paul

    (Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law, University of Oxford)

  • Enriques, Luca

    (Professor of Business Law, University of Bologna, and a Commissioner of Consob)

  • Hansmann, Henry B.

    (Augustus E. Lines Professor of Law, Yale Law School)

  • Hertig, Gerard

    (Professor of Law, ETH (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology), Zurich)

  • Hopt, Klaus J.

    (Professor, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg)

  • Kanda, Hideki

    (Professor of Law, University of Tokyo)

  • Rock, Edward B.

    (Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, and Co-Director, Institute for Law & Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

This is the long-awaited second edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. This edition has been comprehensively updated to reflect profound changes in corporate law. It now includes consideration of additional matters such as the highly topical issue of enforcement in corporate law, and explores the continued convergence of corporate law across jurisdictions. The authors start from the premise that corporate (or company) law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems: (1) the opportunism of managers vis-a-vis shareholders; (2) the opportunism of controlling shareholders vis-a-vis minority shareholders; and (3) the opportunism of shareholders as a class vis-a-vis other corporate constituencies, such as corporate creditors and employees. Every jurisdiction must address these problems in a variety of contexts, framed by the corporation's internal dynamics and its interactions with the product, labor, capital, and takeover markets. The authors' central claim, however, is that corporate (or company) forms are fundamentally similar and that, to a surprising degree, jurisdictions pick from among the same handful of legal strategies to address the three basic agency issues. This book explains in detail how (and why) the principal European jurisdictions, Japan, and the United States sometimes select identical legal strategies to address a given corporate law problem, and sometimes make divergent choices. After an introductory discussion of agency issues and legal strategies, the book addresses the basic governance structure of the corporation, including the powers of the board of directors and the shareholders meeting. It proceeds to creditor protection measures, related-party transactions, and fundamental corporate actions such as mergers and charter amendments. Finally, it concludes with an examination of friendly acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and the regulation of the capital markets. Contributors to this volume - Hansmann and Kraakman Hansmann and Kraakman Hansmann and Kraakman Hertig and Kanda Hertig and Kanda Rock, Kanda, and Kraakman Davies and Hopt Hertig, Kraakman and Rock Hertig, Hansmann, Kraakman, Rock, Hopt and Kanda Hertig, Hansmann, Kraakman, Rock, Hopt and Kanda Davies, Hertig and Hopt

Suggested Citation

  • Kraakman, Reinier & Armour, John & Davies, Paul & Enriques, Luca & Hansmann, Henry B. & Hertig, Gerard & Hopt, Klaus J. & Kanda, Hideki & Rock, Edward B., 2009. "The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199565849.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199565849
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    Cited by:

    1. Mikami, Kazuhiko, 2018. "Are cooperative firms a less competitive form of business? Production efficiency and financial viability of cooperative firms with tradable membership shares," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 487-502.
    2. Simon Deakin, 2013. "The Legal Framework Governing Business Firms & its Implications for Manufacturing Scale & Performance: The UK Experience in International Perspective," Working Papers wp449, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    3. Gerum Elmar & Mölls Sascha H., 2013. "Corporate Governance-Systeme und Unternehmensfinanzierung - Empirische Befunde für deutsche Großunternehmen / Corporate Governance-Systems and Corporate Financing – Empirical Evidence for large corpor," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 64(1), pages 195-220, January.
    4. Chassagnon, Virgile, 2012. "Une analyse historique de la nature juridique de la firme," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 12.
    5. Deakin, Simon & Sarkar, Prabirjit & Singh, Ajit, 2011. "An end to consensus? the selective impact of corporate law reform on financial development," MPRA Paper 39047, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Bjuggren, Per-Olof & Elmoznino Laufer, Michel, 2014. "Bank Financing of Start-ups – Findings from a survey," Ratio Working Papers 232, The Ratio Institute.
    7. Bjuggren, Per-Olof & Elmoznino Laufer, Michel, 2015. "Startups, Financing and Geography– Findings from a survey," Ratio Working Papers 255, The Ratio Institute.
    8. Lorenzo Sasso, 2016. "Bank Capital Structure and Financial Innovation: Antagonists or Two Sides of the Same Coin?," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 225-263.
    9. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Oscar Gelderblom & Joost Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, 2017. "The Emergence of the Corporate Form," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 193-236.
    10. Hasseldine, John & Morris, Gregory, 2013. "Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance: A comment and reflection," Accounting forum, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-14.
    11. CAO, Ning & McGUINNESS, Paul B. & XI, Chao, 2021. "Does securities enforcement improve disclosure quality? An examination of Chinese listed companies' restatement activities," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    12. Simon Deakin, 2017. "Tony Lawson’s Theory of the Corporation: Towards a Social Ontology of Law," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 41(5), pages 1505-1523.
    13. Massimiliano Vatiero, 2017. "On The (Political) Origin Of ‘Corporate Governance’ Species," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 393-409, April.
    14. Massimiliano Vatiero, 2017. "Learning from the Swiss Corporate Governance Exception," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 330-343, May.
    15. Erik P. M. Vermeulen, 2013. "Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement," OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers 7, OECD Publishing.
    16. Sainati, Tristano & Locatelli, Giorgio & Mignacca, Benito, 2023. "Social sustainability of energy infrastructures: The role of the programme governance framework," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 282(C).
    17. Valentina Franca & Anja Strojin Štampar, 2021. "Board‐level employee representative independence: Myth or reality? Theoretical analysis and empirical research—the case for Slovenia," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(4), pages 569-585, December.
    18. Almlöf, Hanna & Bjuggren, Per-Olof, 2017. "What matters in Design of Corporate Law," Ratio Working Papers 299, The Ratio Institute.
    19. José Manuel Castro Arango, 2015. "El concepto de dividendo en los convenios de doble imposición," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, edition 1, number 807, October.
    20. Carien van Mourik, 2014. "The Equity Theories and the IASB Conceptual Framework," Accounting in Europe, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 219-233, December.
    21. Simon Deakin, 2017. "Tony Lawson's Theory of the Corporation: Towards a Social Ontology of Law," Working Papers wp491, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    22. Holderness, Clifford G., 2018. "Equity issuances and agency costs: The telling story of shareholder approval around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 415-439.
    23. Nicola Moscariello & Michele Pizzo & Dmytro Govorun & Alexander Kostyuk, 2019. "Independent minority directors and firm value in a principal–principal agency setting: evidence from Italy," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 23(1), pages 165-194, March.
    24. Leixnering, Stephan & Bramböck, Stefanie, 2013. "Public-Corporate-Governance-Kodizes: Die Köpenickiade der Beteiligungsverwaltung," ZögU - Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 36(2-3), pages 170-190.
    25. Volonté, Christophe, 2012. "Foundations of Corporate Governance," Working papers 2012/05, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.

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