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Institutional complementarities between labour laws and innovation

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  • BELLOC, FILIPPO

Abstract

We analyse how institutional complementarities between employee representation laws and dismissal restrictions influence aggregate innovation outcomes. We argue that greater employee voice, due to improved employee representation legislations, may spur innovative effort by employees only when shareholders cannot renegotiate ex-ante agreements with workers over revenue sharing, by threatening dismissal. We perform a panel regression analysis, exploiting country-sector panel data over the 1977–2005 period, and find that stronger employee representation laws in the presence of stricter firing restrictions are in fact associated with higher patenting activity. Consistently with our theoretical argument, the magnitude of this empirical relationship is seen to be relatively larger in those sectors where the human capital contribution to production is higher. Implications for the analysis of economic institutions and for legal policy making are proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Belloc, Filippo, 2019. "Institutional complementarities between labour laws and innovation," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 235-258, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:15:y:2019:i:02:p:235-258_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Musolesi & Mario Nosvelli, 2025. "Technology, labour regulation, and nonparametric panel data modelling," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 1799-1828, April.
    2. F. Landini & C. Franco, 2020. "Organizational Drivers of Innovation: The Role of Workforce Agility," Economics Department Working Papers 2020-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    3. Belloc, Filippo, 2021. "Industrial actions and firing regimes: How deregulating worker “Exit” reshapes worker “Voice”," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 251-264.
    4. Nebojša Stojčić & Nina Vujanović & Christopher F. Baum, 2025. "Breaking or making futures: How laws and regulations shape innovation in emerging innovation systems," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 1743-1782, June.
    5. Buyse, Tim & Heylen, Freddy & Schoonackers, Ruben, 2020. "On the impact of public policies and wage formation on business investment in research and development," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 188-199.
    6. Simon Deakin & Kamelia Pourkermani, 2026. "The Effects of Labour Laws on Productivity, Employment, Unemployment and the Labour Share of National Income: Analysis of New Evidence from the Cambridge Leximetric Database, with a UK-China Comparison," Working Papers wp547, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    7. Filippo Belloc & Gabriel Burdin & Fabio Landini, 2020. "Corporate Hierarchies and Labor Institutions," Department of Economics University of Siena 827, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    8. Traverso, Silvio & Vatiero, Massimiliano & Zaninotto, Enrico, 2025. "The complementarity between automation and flexible labour contracts: firm-level evidence from Italy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21, pages 1-1, January.
    9. Franco, Chiara & Landini, Fabio, 2022. "Organizational drivers of innovation: The role of workforce agility," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(2).
    10. Burdin, Gabriel & Pérotin, Virginie, 2019. "Employee representation and flexible working time," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    11. Filippo Belloc, 2019. "Employer‐employee profit‐sharing and the incentives to innovate when the dismissal regulation matters," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 641-654, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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