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中小投资者保护、股权结构与公司价值
[Protection of Minority Shareholders, Ownership Structure and Corporate Valuation]

  • Chen, Yan
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between investor protection and corporate valuation. “Tunneling effects” which means that the controlling shareholders enrich themselves by expropriating the rights and interests of minor shareholders are usually referred in recent literatures of corporate finance. In this paper, we build a simple model which combines the firm’s inside ownership structure with outside law and regulation surrounding in order to inhibit “Tunneling effects”, and then we analyze their effects on corporate valuation. Finally, we test the hypothesis obtained from the model using a sample of 110 firms listed in Chinese stock market. The empirical results show that better protection of minority shareholders and appropriate ownership structures can help to elevate the valuation of firms.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12427/1/MPRA_paper_12427.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 12427.

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Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision: Jun 2008
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:12427
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  1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
  2. Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, 2003. "Legal institutions and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3136, The World Bank.
  3. Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, 1998. "The Choice Of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, And The Decision To Go Public," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 187-225, February.
  4. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control," Working papers 440, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Rafael La porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, 06.
  6. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Working Paper 19443, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  7. Rafael Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, 02.
  8. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 2003. "Financial and legal institutions and firm size," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2997, The World Bank.
  9. Ross Levine, 2004. "Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10766, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenson, 2000. "Investor Protection and Equity Markets," NBER Working Papers 7974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Thorsten Beck & Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2002. "Law and Finance: why Does Legal Origin Matter?," NBER Working Papers 9379, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
  13. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  14. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 2002. "Financial and legal constraints to firm growth - Does size matter?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2784, The World Bank.
  15. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2002. "Property Rights and Finance," NBER Working Papers 8852, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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