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The Timing of Preference and Prejudice in Sequential Hiring Games

Author

Listed:
  • Waddell, Glen R.

    () (University of Oregon)

  • Lee, Logan M.

    () (Grinnell College)

Abstract

We model a hiring process in which the candidate is evaluated sequentially by two agents of the firm who each observe an independent signal of the candidate's productivity. We introduce the potential for taste-based discrimination and characterize how one agent's private valuation of the candidate influences the other agent's hiring practices. This influence is often in an offsetting direction and is partially corrective. Yet, this offsetting response can also be large enough that even a high-productivity candidate who is privately favoured by one agent, as may be the case in efforts to increase gender or racial diversity, is less likely to be hired even when the other agent has no preference over private, non-productive attributes.

Suggested Citation

  • Waddell, Glen R. & Lee, Logan M., 2014. "The Timing of Preference and Prejudice in Sequential Hiring Games," IZA Discussion Papers 8445, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8445
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jacquemet, Nicolas & Yannelis, Constantine, 2012. "Indiscriminate discrimination: A correspondence test for ethnic homophily in the Chicago labor market," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 824-832.
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    3. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00745109 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Luo, Guo Ying, 2002. "Collective Decision-Making and Heterogeneity in Tastes," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 20(2), pages 213-226, April.
    5. David Bjerk, 2008. "Glass Ceilings or Sticky Floors? Statistical Discrimination in a Dynamic Model of Hiring and Promotion," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(530), pages 961-982, July.
    6. Peter Kuhn & Kailing Shen, 2013. "Gender Discrimination in Job Ads: Evidence from China," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(1), pages 287-336.
    7. Nicolas Jacquemet & Constantine Yannelis, 2012. "Indiscriminate Discrimination: A Correspondence Test for Ethnic Homophily in the Chicago Labor Market," Post-Print hal-00745109, HAL.
    8. Breit, William & Horowitz, John B, 1995. "Discrimination and Diversity: Market and Non-market Settings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 84(1-2), pages 63-75, July.
    9. Michael Ewens & Bryan Tomlin & Liang Choon Wang, 2014. "Statistical Discrimination or Prejudice? A Large Sample Field Experiment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 96(1), pages 119-134, March.
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    12. Magnus Carlsson & Dan-Olof Rooth, 2012. "Revealing taste-based discrimination in hiring: a correspondence testing experiment with geographic variation," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(18), pages 1861-1864, December.
    13. Phelps, Edmund S, 1972. "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 659-661, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    hiring; race; gender; diversity; discrimination;

    JEL classification:

    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics
    • J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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