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The Relationship between Federal Budget Amendments and Local Electoral Power

Author

Listed:
  • Firpo, Sergio

    () (Insper, São Paulo)

  • Ponczek, Vladimir

    () (Sao Paulo School of Economics)

  • Sanfelice, Viviane

    (University of Rochester)

Abstract

The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we investigate whether politicians use resources from the federal budget as a strategy to maintain and expand their political capital. Second, we examine whether such a strategy is rewarded by voters who elect politicians who assist their municipalities through federal expenditures. The main contribution of this study is its illustration of how the use of fiscal policy affects the local political power of legislators in Brazil. We focus on the geographical distribution of votes received by politicians within their electoral districts instead of only examining the final outcomes of reelection efforts. Our findings indicate that politicians tend to favor municipalities that were important to their elections and that voters support candidates who have brought resources to their localities. However, given that Brazil uses a party-open-list proportional representation system for congressional elections, influencing the behavior of voters through amendments is not sufficient to increase a candidate's chances of winning reelection.

Suggested Citation

  • Firpo, Sergio & Ponczek, Vladimir & Sanfelice, Viviane, 2014. "The Relationship between Federal Budget Amendments and Local Electoral Power," IZA Discussion Papers 7918, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7918
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gerrit J. Gonschorek & Günther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir, 2018. "To the ones in need or the ones you need? The Political Economy of Central Discretionary Grants − Empirical Evidence from Indonesia," Discussion Paper Series 36, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Jan 2018.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    voter's preference; pork barrel; politician's strategies; electoral power;

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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