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Quantifying political effects in the spatial allocation of public services

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  • Fredriksson, Anders
  • Macchione Saes, Maria Sylvia

Abstract

The spatial allocation of citizen-accessed public services is typically influenced by factors related to citizen demand, but also by other factors, including political considerations. We develop a method to quantify how political factors influence citizens’ spatial access to services. The method is illustrated through the study of two different public services in the state of São Paulo, Brazil; Citizen Service Centers and outpatient medical clinics. Each of the two programs, which are analyzed separately, consists of a number of units for in-person service delivery, spread across the state. We first build a regression model to analyze the allocation of each service, using citizen demand, official program criteria, and related variables as explanatory factors. The degree of explanation of the models improves once political variables are included. For each service, the geographical location of some of the implemented service units are explained by the political variables. Operations Research methods are then used to find an alternative, optimal, spatial allocation for the units discerned as political in the regression analysis. We quantify how much average citizen travel distance would have decreased, had this counterfactual allocation been implemented. Travel distance is one measure of welfare in spatial allocation problems and on average distances are thus longer in the presence of politically induced allocations. Longer distances can, in turn, have other first order welfare effects, for instance on health outcomes. Understanding political effects is thus important. Related to these considerations, we offer policy conclusions and discuss the generalizability of the study.

Suggested Citation

  • Fredriksson, Anders & Macchione Saes, Maria Sylvia, 2025. "Quantifying political effects in the spatial allocation of public services," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceps:v:99:y:2025:i:c:s0038012125000291
    DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2025.102180
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock

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