Social Pressure Influences Decisions of Individuals: Evidence from the Behavior of Football Referees
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsprincipal-agent relationship; favoritism; personnel economics;
- J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General
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