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Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure

  • Glazer, Amihai


    (University of California, Irvine)

  • Kanniainen, Vesa


    (University of Helsinki)

  • Poutvaara, Panu


    (University of Munich)

Corporate success often resembles a snowball. We show how initial luck in hiring talented people, the resulting technological advantage, superior corporate culture, and status-seeking by workers can make small initial differences generate large differences over time.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1426.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1426
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