Effects Of Tax Reforms In A Shirking Model With Union Bargaining
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More about this item
KeywordsLabour taxation; union bargaining; efficiency wages;
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-MAC-2006-02-19 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-02-19 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2006-02-19 (Public Finance)
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