IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/isu/genstf/2008010108000016832.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Essays in macroeconomics, international trade and the environment

Author

Listed:
  • Sikdar, Shiva

Abstract

This dissertation addresses the problem of optimal recapitalization of banking sectors after banking crises and analyzes the effect of trade liberalization on environmental policy and welfare in a strategic setting in the presence of transboundary pollution.;Government-financed bank restructuring programs, occasionally costing up to 50% of GDP, have commonly been used to resolve banking crises. In Chapter 2 analyze the Ramsey-optimal paths of bank recapitalization programs that weigh recapitalization benefits and costs under different financing options. In our model bank credit is essential, due to a working capital constraint on firms, and banks are financial intermediaries that borrow from households and lend to firms. A banking crisis produces a disruption of credit and a fall in output equivalent to those in developing countries affected by banking crises. Full recapitalization of the banking system immediately after the crisis is optimal only if international credit is available. One-shot recapitalization is not optimal with domestically-financed programs, even if the government has access to non-distortionary taxes. The welfare cost of a crisis is substantial: the equivalent permanent decline in the no-crisis steady state comsumption ranges between 0.51% and 0.65%, depending on the source of financing the recapitalization program.;In Chapter 3 analyze the effects of free trade on environmental policies in a strategic setting with transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental outcomes, which makes both countries worse off. In our model it is not the terms of trade motive, but the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution, that drives countries to relax domestic environmental policy. When command and control policies such as quotas are used instead of taxes, countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, when permits are tradable across countries, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. In the free trade equilibrium, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level, while the relative ranking of pollution in the internationally tradable quota equilibrium and the tax equilibrium depends on the relative magnitudes of domestic and transboundary pollution and the relative slopes of the demand and supply schedules. The nontradable quota equilibrium strictly welfare-dominates the tax equilibrium.;Chapter 4 extends the model of the previous chapter to explicitly model differences between countries that may lead to trade in equilibrium. We analyze the effect of trade liberalization on pollution policy and welfare in the presence of both the terms of trade motives and the transboundary pollution effect. We find that, when countries use taxes to regulate pollution, the importer of the polluting good unambiguously lowers its tax due to trade liberalization, while the exporter of the polluting good reduces (increases) its tax if the transboundary pollution (terms of trade) effect dominates. It is possible for both countries to be worse off due to trade liberalization. When the only source of comparative advantage is a difference in preference towards pollution, then aggregate (world) welfare is higher under free trade as compared to autarky if countries use quotas to regulate pollution, but is lower under free trade relative to autarky if the policy instrument in both countries is a pollution tax.

Suggested Citation

  • Sikdar, Shiva, 2008. "Essays in macroeconomics, international trade and the environment," ISU General Staff Papers 2008010108000016832, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:2008010108000016832
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=16832&context=rtd
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Detragiache, Enrica & Rajan, Raghuram, 2008. "The real effect of banking crises," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 89-112, January.
    2. Christina D. Romer, 1993. "The Nation in Depression," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 19-39, Spring.
    3. Neumeyer, Pablo A. & Perri, Fabrizio, 2005. "Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 345-380, March.
    4. Rodney D. Ludema & Ian Wooton, 1994. "Cross-Border Externalities and Trade Liberalization: The Strategic Control of Pollution," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(4), pages 950-966, November.
    5. Patrick Honohan & Daniela Klingebiel, 2000. "Controlling fiscal costs of banking crises," Proceedings 682, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    6. Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, 2001. "Re-Examining the Contributions of Money and Banking Shocks to the U.S. Great Depression," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 183-260 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Oviedo, P. Marcelo & Sikdar, Shiva, 2008. "Optimal Banking Sector Recapitalization," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12861, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    8. Chava, Sudheer & Purnanandam, Amiyatosh, 2011. "The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent borrowers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 116-135, January.
    9. Honohan, Patrick & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2000. "Controlling the fiscal costs of banking crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2441, The World Bank.
    10. Kazuharu Kiyono & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2003. "Domestic and international strategic interactions in environment policy formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 613-633, March.
    11. Azzimonti, Marina & Sarte, Pierre-Daniel & Soares, Jorge, 2009. "Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(9), pages 1662-1681, September.
    12. Harvey E. Lapan & Shiva Sikdar, 2011. "Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 1-18, February.
    13. Copeland, Brian R & Taylor, M Scott, 1995. "Trade and Transboundary Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 716-737, September.
    14. Markusen, James R., 1975. "International externalities and optimal tax structures," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 15-29, February.
    15. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica & Gupta, Poonam, 2006. "Inside the crisis: An empirical analysis of banking systems in distress," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 702-718, August.
    16. Rauscher, Michael, 1997. "International Trade, Factor Movements, and the Environment," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198290506.
    17. Jota Ishikawa & Kazuharu Kiyono, 2006. "Greenhouse-Gas Emission Controls In An Open Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(2), pages 431-450, May.
    18. Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Klingebiel, Daniela, 1996. "Bank insolvencies : cross-country experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1620, The World Bank.
    19. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 1998. "The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and Developed Countries," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(1), pages 81-109, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:2008010108000016832. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Curtis Balmer). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deiasus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.