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Links of interest of Swiss MPs: a comprehensive dataset

Author

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  • Martin Péclat
  • Stefano Puddu

Abstract

This study provides a comprehensive, accurate and ready-to-use dataset on the relationships between the members of the Swiss Parliament and groups of interests. We capture politicians' linkages exploiting (1) their mandates in legal entities; (2) the enterprises, associations or other organizations related to the people they invite for attending parliamentary sessions; and (3) their occupations. Using NOGA 2008 and SSCO 2000 codes, legal entities and professions are classified into 28 categories. We approximate politicians' ties intensity by the number of occurrences in a particular category. The results show that there are substantial differences between the two chambers, and across the main parliamentary groups. The three types of information employed provide complementary information.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Péclat & Stefano Puddu, 2015. "Links of interest of Swiss MPs: a comprehensive dataset," IRENE Working Papers 15-04, IRENE Institute of Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:irn:wpaper:15-04
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    File URL: https://www5.unine.ch/RePEc/ftp/irn/pdfs/WP15-04.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Puddu & Martin Péclat, 2015. "Dangerous Liaisons: Interests groups and politicians' votes. A Swiss perspective," IRENE Working Papers 15-09, IRENE Institute of Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Groups of pressure; lobbies; special interests; Swiss Parliament; voting behaviour.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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