IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ira/wpaper/201920.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

“Tax me, but don’t drown me in regulations: Understanding differences in corruption across the countries of Europe"

Author

Listed:
  • Germà Bel

    (Department of Econometrics & Riskcenter-IREA, Universidad de Barcelona, (Barcelona, Spain))

Abstract

Differences in corruption perception across the countries of Europe are marked and persistent over time. This study seeks to explain these differences in the countries of both the European Union and the European Free Trade Association during 2007–2017. The core hypothesis is that the style of government intervention in the economy –rather than the size of government– is the main explanatory factor for the differences. To test this hypothesis, the empirical analysis disentangles the effects of the two main government tools for intervention in the economy: taxation and regulation. The main result is that the fiscal burden does not consistently present a significant relationship with corruption. In contrast, the regulatory burden associated with excessive red tape is a strong driver of corruption, because a consistent and significant positive association is found. Furthermore, differences in legal origins, history, democratic experience and several economic factors contribute to explaining differences between European countries

Suggested Citation

  • Germà Bel, 2019. "“Tax me, but don’t drown me in regulations: Understanding differences in corruption across the countries of Europe"," IREA Working Papers 201920, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Dec 2019.
  • Handle: RePEc:ira:wpaper:201920
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2019/201920.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kalenborn, Christine & Lessmann, Christian, 2013. "The impact of democracy and press freedom on corruption: Conditionality matters," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 857-886.
    2. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    3. Ronald MacDonald & Muhammad Tariq Majeed, 2011. "Causes of corruption in European countries: history, law, and political stability," Working Papers 2011_24, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    4. Montinola, Gabriella R. & Jackman, Robert W., 2002. "Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 147-170, January.
    5. Hakhverdian, Armen & Mayne, Quinton, 2012. "Institutional Trust, Education, and Corruption: A Micro-Macro Interactive Approach," Scholarly Articles 9639965, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    6. Dreher, Axel & Kotsogiannis, Christos & McCorriston, Steve, 2007. "Corruption around the world: Evidence from a structural model," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 443-466, September.
    7. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    8. Axel Dreher & Friedrich Schneider, 2010. "Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 215-238, July.
    9. Krueger, Anne O, 1993. "Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 351-355, May.
    10. Beekman, Gonne & Bulte, Erwin & Nillesen, Eleonora, 2014. "Corruption, investments and contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence from rural Liberia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 37-47.
    11. Shrabani Saha & Jen-Je Su, 2012. "Investigating the Interaction Effect of Democracy and Economic Freedom on Corruption: A Cross-Country Quantile Regression Analysis," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 389-396, December.
    12. Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2003. "Democracy, rent seeking, public spending and growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 445-466, March.
    13. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    14. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-1042, July.
    15. Axel Dreher & Christos Kotsogiannis & Steve McCorriston, 2009. "How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(6), pages 773-796, December.
    16. Alesina, Alberto & Angeletos, George-Marios, 2005. "Corruption, inequality, and fairness," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1227-1244, October.
    17. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
    18. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
    19. Mr. Carlos A Leite & Jens Weidmann, 1999. "Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth," IMF Working Papers 1999/085, International Monetary Fund.
    20. Andreas Buehn & Friedrich Schneider, 2012. "Corruption and the shadow economy: like oil and vinegar, like water and fire?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 172-194, February.
    21. Truex, Rory, 2011. "Corruption, Attitudes, and Education: Survey Evidence from Nepal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1133-1142, July.
    22. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    23. Simplice Asongu & Jacinta C Nwachukwu, 2015. "The incremental effect of education on corruption: evidence of synergy from lifelong learning," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2288-2308.
    24. Randall Holcombe & Christopher Boudreaux, 2015. "Regulation and corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 75-85, July.
    25. Noemí Peña Miguel & Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 2019. "Is privatization related to corruption? An empirical analysis of European countries," Public Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 69-95, January.
    26. Alessandro Pellegata & Vincenzo Memoli, 2016. "Can Corruption Erode Confidence in Political Institutions Among European Countries? Comparing the Effects of Different Measures of Perceived Corruption," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 391-412, August.
    27. Robert W. McGee (ed.), 2008. "Taxation and Public Finance in Transition and Developing Economies," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-0-387-25712-9, September.
    28. Saha, Shrabani & Gounder, Rukmani & Su, Jen-Je, 2009. "The interaction effect of economic freedom and democracy on corruption: A panel cross-country analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 173-176, November.
    29. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    30. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    31. Goel, Rajeev K & Nelson, Michael A, 1998. "Corruption and Government Size: A Disaggregated Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 107-120, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Germà Bel, 2022. "Beyond government size: Types of government intervention and corruption," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1174-1196, October.
    2. Eugen Dimant & Guglielmo Tosato, 2018. "Causes And Effects Of Corruption: What Has Past Decade'S Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 335-356, April.
    3. repec:pdn:wpaper:79 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:pdn:wpaper:70 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kotera, Go & Okada, Keisuke & Samreth, Sovannroeun, 2012. "Government size, democracy, and corruption: An empirical investigation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2340-2348.
    6. Blaise Gnimassoun, Joseph Keneck Massil, 2019. "Determinants of corruption: can we put all countries in the same basket?," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 16(2), pages 239-276, December.
    7. Blaise Gnimassoun & Joseph Keneck Massil, 2016. "Determinants of corruption: Can we put all countries in the same basket?," Working Papers hal-04141599, HAL.
    8. Tran, My Thi Ha, 2021. "Public Sector Management And Corruption In Asean Plus Six," OSF Preprints stxw4, Center for Open Science.
    9. Graf Lambsdorff, Johann, 2005. "Consequences and causes of corruption: What do we know from a cross-section of countries?," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-34-05, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/o45fqtltm960r11iq437ski90 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2003. "The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(3), pages 341-365, July.
    12. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2005. "The Role of Government in Anti-Social Redistributive Activities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1427, CESifo.
    13. Mukherjee, Deepraj, 2015. "Did pre-WTO agreements curb corruption?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-10.
    14. Filipe R. Campante & Davin Chor & Quoc‐Anh Do, 2009. "Instability And The Incentives For Corruption," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 42-92, March.
    15. Roberto Dell’Anno, 2020. "Corruption around the world: an analysis by partial least squares—structural equation modeling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 327-350, September.
    16. Heli Virta, 2010. "The linkage between corruption and shadow economy size: does geography matter?," International Journal of Development Issues, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 9(1), pages 4-24, April.
    17. Larissa Batrancea & Anca Nichita & Ioan Batrancea & Lucian Gaban, 2018. "The Strenght of the Relationship Between Shadow Economy and Corruption: Evidence from a Worldwide Country-Sample," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 1119-1143, August.
    18. Mohammad Abdul Munim Joarder & Monir Uddin Ahmed, 2023. "Does natural resource abundance breed corruption? The role of political institutions," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(9), pages 1-43, September.
    19. Ella Hugo & David A. Savage & Friedrich Schneider & Benno Torgler, 2021. "Two sides of the same coin or two different coins? Exploring the duality of corruption in Latin America," CREMA Working Paper Series 2021-26, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    20. You, Jong-Sung & Khagram, Sanjeev, 2004. "Inequality and Corruption," Working Paper Series rwp04-001, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Regulation; Taxation; Europe. JEL classification: D73; H29; L51; N44; O52.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ira:wpaper:201920. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alicia García (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feubaes.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.