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¿Por qué deben las economías emergentes renunciar a su moneda nacional? El argumento a favor

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  • Enrique Mendoza

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) El contagio financiero y las paradas repentinas de los ingresos de capitales que se experimentan durante las crisis de los mercados emergentes pueden originarse en una combinación explosiva de falta de credibilidad de políticas e imperfecciones del mercado mundial de capitales que aqueja a las economías emergentes con monedas nacionales. De ahí que este trabajo proponga que el abandono de la moneda nacional en favor de la adopción de una moneda fuerte puede contribuir a reducir considerablemente la vulnerabilidad de los países emergentes a esas crisis. La credibilidad de sus políticas financieras se verá realzada considerablemente por la subordinación implícita a las instituciones de diseño de políticas del emisor de la moneda fuerte. Su acceso a los mercados internacionales de capitales mejorará del mismo modo que los conocimientos, la experiencia y la información que ya reúnen los inversionistas mundiales para evaluar la política monetaria que el emisor de moneda fuerte aplicaría a las economías emergentes. Aún así, la adopción de una moneda fuerte no elimina los ciclos económicos ni descarta todas las formas de crisis financieras ni resuelve los problemas fiscales graves que aquejan a las economías emergentes, y ello conlleva ceder la potestad sobre el monedaje y los posibles beneficios de tener una política monetaria independiente. Pero esas desventajas se quedan pequeñas ante la necesidad apremiante de permitir que los países emergentes accedan a los mercados mundiales de capitales sin exponerse al riesgo de paradas repentinas recurrentes.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrique Mendoza, 2002. "¿Por qué deben las economías emergentes renunciar a su moneda nacional? El argumento a favor," Research Department Publications 4310, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4310
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