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Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities

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  • Ronconi, Lucas
  • Zarazaga, Rodrigo

Abstract

This paper shows that workers who do not receive legally mandated benefits due to employer noncompliance have a negative view not only of their employers, as has been documented, but also of the State. Those workers believe that the State did not protect their rights, and hence they feel fewer obligations to comply with their duties as citizens. Using a list experiment, as well as household data from nine Latin American countries, the paper shows that non-registered workers are less likely to obey the law, pay taxes and vote compared to registered workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronconi, Lucas & Zarazaga, Rodrigo, 2015. "Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6828, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:6828
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lucas Ronconi & Ravi Kanbur & Santiago López-Cariboni, 2019. "Who demands labour (de)regulation in the developing world?: Insider-outsider theory revisited," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2019-90, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Ronconi, Lucas, 2019. "From Citizen's Rights to Civic Responsibilities," IZA Discussion Papers 12457, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Mariana VIOLLAZ, 2018. "Are labour inspections effective when labour regulations vary according to the size of the firm? Evidence from Peru," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 157(2), pages 213-242, June.
    4. Kanbur, Ravi & Ronconi, Lucas & López-Cariboni, Santiago, 2020. "Who demands labour (de)regulation in the developing world? Insider–outsider theory revisited," CEPR Discussion Papers 14277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Roberto Chang, 2008. "Inflation Targeting, Reserves Accumulation, and Exchange Rate Management in Latin America," Borradores de Economia 487, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    6. Matthew Amengual & Salo Coslovsky & Duanyi Yang, 2017. "Who opposes labor regulation? Explaining variation in employers’ opinions," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(4), pages 404-421, December.
    7. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2010. "A Comparison of Monetary Anchor Options, Including Product Price Targeting, for Commodity-Exporters in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 16362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Yonghong An & Pengfei Liu, 2020. "Eliciting Information from Sensitive Survey Questions," Papers 2009.01430, arXiv.org.
    9. Lucas Ronconi, 2019. "Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 457-457, March.
    10. Lucas RONCONI & Ravi KANBUR & Santiago LÓPEZ‐CARIBONI, 2023. "Who demands labour (de)regulation in the developing world? Revisiting the insider–outsider theory," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 162(2), pages 223-243, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Latin America; Citizenship; Vote; Citizenship responsibilities; Informality; Taxes; Labor;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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