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Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities

Listed author(s):
  • Lucas Ronconi
  • Rodrigo Zarazaga

This paper shows that workers who do not receive legally mandated benefits due to employer noncompliance have a negative view not only of their employers, as has been documented, but also of the State. Those workers believe that the State did not protect their rights, and hence they feel fewer obligations to comply with their duties as citizens. Using a list experiment, as well as household data from nine Latin American countries, the paper shows that non-registered workers are less likely to obey the law, pay taxes and vote compared to registered workers.

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File URL: http://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6828/Labor%20Exclusion%20and%20the%20Erosion%20of%20Citizenship%20Responsibilities.pdf?sequence=1
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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank in its series IDB Publications (Working Papers) with number 6828.

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Date of creation: Mar 2015
Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:6828
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  12. Daniel Ortega & Lucas Ronconi & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2016. "Reciprocity and Willingness to Pay Taxes: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Latin America," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 55-87, April.
  13. Richard M. Locke & Fei Qin & Alberto Brause, 2007. "Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(1), pages 3-31, October.
  14. Gasparini Leonardo & Leonardo Tornaroli, 2009. "Labor Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Patterns and Trends from Household Survey Microdata," REVISTA DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE, September.
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  16. David Weil, 2005. "Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New Approach to Regulating the Minimum Wage," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 58(2), pages 238-257, January.
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  18. ArnabK. Basu & NancyH. Chau & Ravi Kanbur, 2010. "Turning a Blind Eye: Costly Enforcement, Credible Commitment and Minimum Wage Laws," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 244-269, 03.
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  21. Amengual, Matthew, 2010. "Complementary Labor Regulation: The Uncoordinated Combination of State and Private Regulators in the Dominican Republic," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 405-414, March.
  22. Berliner, Daniel & Greenleaf, Anne & Lake, Milli & Noveck, Jennifer, 2015. "Building Capacity, Building Rights? State Capacity and Labor Rights in Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 127-139.
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  25. repec:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:02:p:271-294_09 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Freeman, Richard B., 1999. "The economics of crime," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 52, pages 3529-3571 Elsevier.
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