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Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities

Author

Listed:
  • Lucas Ronconi
  • Rodrigo Zarazaga

Abstract

This paper shows that workers who do not receive legally mandated benefits due to employer noncompliance have a negative view not only of their employers, as has been documented, but also of the State. Those workers believe that the State did not protect their rights, and hence they feel fewer obligations to comply with their duties as citizens. Using a list experiment, as well as household data from nine Latin American countries, the paper shows that non-registered workers are less likely to obey the law, pay taxes and vote compared to registered workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucas Ronconi & Rodrigo Zarazaga, 2015. "Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6828, Inter-American Development Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:6828
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    File URL: http://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6828/Labor%20Exclusion%20and%20the%20Erosion%20of%20Citizenship%20Responsibilities.pdf?sequence=1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Chang, 2008. "Inflation Targeting, Reserves Accumulation, and Exchange Rate Management in Latin America," Borradores de Economia 487, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    2. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2010. "A Comparison of Monetary Anchor Options, Including Product Price Targeting, for Commodity-Exporters in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 16362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Workforce & Employment; Taxation; Labor Relations; Latin America; Citizenship; Vote; Citizenship responsibilities; Informality; Taxes; Labor;

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods

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