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Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities

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  • Ronconi, Lucas
  • Zarazaga S.J., Rodrigo

Abstract

This paper shows that workers who do not receive legally mandated benefits due to employer noncompliance take a negative perspective – not only toward the employer as it has been documented – but also against the state. They consider that the state did not protect their rights, and hence feel fewer obligations to comply with their duties as citizens. Using a list experiment, as well as household data from nine Latin American countries, we show that nonregistered workers are less likely to obey the law, pay taxes, and vote compared to registered workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronconi, Lucas & Zarazaga S.J., Rodrigo, 2015. "Labor Exclusion and the Erosion of Citizenship Responsibilities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 453-461.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:74:y:2015:i:c:p:453-461
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.06.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Mariana VIOLLAZ, 2018. "Are labour inspections effective when labour regulations vary according to the size of the firm? Evidence from Peru," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 157(2), pages 213-242, June.
    2. Ronconi, Lucas & Kanbur, Ravi & López-Cariboni, Santiago, 2019. "Who Demands Labour (De)Regulation in the Developing World? Insider–Outsider Theory Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 12831, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Roberto Chang, 2008. "Inflation Targeting, Reserves Accumulation, and Exchange Rate Management in Latin America," Borradores de Economia 487, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    4. Lucas Ronconi, 2019. "Enforcement of labor regulations in developing countries," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 457-457, March.
    5. Ronconi, Lucas, 2019. "From Citizen's Rights to Civic Responsibilities," IZA Discussion Papers 12457, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Kanbur, Ravi & Ronconi, Lucas & López-Cariboni, Santiago, 2020. "Who demands labour (de)regulation in the developing world? Insider–outsider theory revisited," CEPR Discussion Papers 14277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Matthew Amengual & Salo Coslovsky & Duanyi Yang, 2017. "Who opposes labor regulation? Explaining variation in employers’ opinions," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(4), pages 404-421, December.
    8. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2010. "A Comparison of Monetary Anchor Options, Including Product Price Targeting, for Commodity-Exporters in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 16362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Yonghong An & Pengfei Liu, 2020. "Eliciting Information from Sensitive Survey Questions," Papers 2009.01430, arXiv.org.
    10. Lucas RONCONI & Ravi KANBUR & Santiago LÓPEZ‐CARIBONI, 2023. "Who demands labour (de)regulation in the developing world? Revisiting the insider–outsider theory," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 162(2), pages 223-243, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    labor; informality; citizenship; vote; reciprocity; Latin America;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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