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Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

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  • Christian Basteck
  • Tijmen R. Daniëls
  • Frank Heinemann

Abstract

Global games are widely used for equilibrium selection to predict behaviour in complete information games with strategic complementarities. We establish two results on the global game selection. First, we show that it is independent of the payoff functions of the global game embedding, though it may depend on the noise distribution. Second, we give a simple sufficient criterion for noise independence in many action games. A many action game may be noise independent if it can be suitably decomposed into smaller (say, binary action) games, for which there are simple criteria guaranteeing noise independence. We delineate the games where noise independence may be established by counting the number of players or actions. In addition, we give an elementary proof that robustness to incomplete information implies noise independence.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Basteck & Tijmen R. Daniëls & Frank Heinemann, 2010. "Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-008, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2010-008
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    2. Agnieszka Janek & Tino Kluge & Rafal Weron & Uwe Wystup, 2010. "FX Smile in the Heston Model," HSC Research Reports HSC/10/02, Hugo Steinhaus Center, Wroclaw University of Technology.
    3. Nikolaus Hautsch & Peter Malec & Melanie Schienle, 2014. "Capturing the Zero: A New Class of Zero-Augmented Distributions and Multiplicative Error Processes," Journal of Financial Econometrics, Society for Financial Econometrics, vol. 12(1), pages 89-121.
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    5. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2011. "Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 749-754.
    6. Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2015. "A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-11.
    7. Franziska Schulze, 2010. "Spatial Dependencies in German Matching Functions," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-054, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
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    10. Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Dönges, Jutta & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Crossing network versus dealer market: Unique equilibrium in the allocation of order flow," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 41-57.
    11. Ulrich Horst & Santiago Moreno-Bromberg, 2010. "Efficiency and Equilibria in Games of Optimal Derivative Design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-035, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    12. Marion Oury, 2012. "Noise-Independent Selection in Multidimensional Global Games," THEMA Working Papers 2012-28, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    13. Honda, Jun, 2011. "Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric 3×3 example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 663-669.
    14. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 683-688.
    15. Szymon Borak & Adam Misiorek & Rafał Weron, 2010. "Models for Heavy-tailed Asset Returns," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-049, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
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    17. Iijima, Ryota, 2015. "Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 120-136.
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    19. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
    20. Carolin Hecht & Katja Hanewald, 2010. "Sociodemographic, Economic, and Psychological Drivers of the Demand for Life Insurance: Evidence from the German Retirement Income Act," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-034, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    21. Vladimir Panov, 2010. "Estimation of the signal subspace without estimation of the inverse covariance matrix," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-050, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    22. Maria Grith & Volker Krätschmer, 2010. "Parametric estimation of risk neutral density functions," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-045, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    global games; equilibrium selection; strategic complementarities;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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