Information Disclosure and Welfare in Housing Markets : A Search-Theoretic Framework with Endogenous Participation and Broker Exit

We develop a search-and-matching model of the housing market with a disclosure parameter θ governing price estimation precision, matching probability, and market participation. Transactions occur when the bid-ask gap falls within a fixed negotiation band; higher disclosure compresses the gap distribution. Model-implied welfare losses are decomposed into nine components. Disciplined by Japanese and UK institutional moments, total losses are 39.0% versus 8.4% of imputed rent. Reduced-form regressions using Japanese prefectural panel data are consistent with the model's two central predictions: higher disclosure coverage is associated with shorter time-on-market and lower price dispersion, with magnitudes close to the model-implied elasticities. Monte Carlo simulations indicate that welfare gains are positive in all simulated draws under the perturbation design. An online appendix develops a dynamic extension exploring broker exit, market collapse, and the akiya crisis.