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Firms' Incentive Provisions: Tournament Structure and Worker Flow

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  • Kambayashi, Ryo
  • Ueno, Yuko

Abstract

This study aims to empirically examine how establishments employ various tools, including promotion, threat of dismissal, progressive base wages, and bonuses, to motivate workers. Starting with the standard tournament model, we incorporate the link between the tournament structure and the worker separation that affects the degree of internal competition for managerial positions. By using an establishment-level panel data set, we find that the average policy of human resource management in Japan, particularly since the global financial crisis, is consistent with tournament theory. Further, there is evidence that establishments use a positive selection scheme for determining the set of candidates. The progressive base wage schedule and the smaller portion of bonus payments for employees who remain are also consistent with the selection scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Kambayashi, Ryo & Ueno, Yuko, 2015. "Firms' Incentive Provisions: Tournament Structure and Worker Flow," RCESR Discussion Paper Series DP15-11, Research Center for Economic and Social Risks, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:rcesrs:dp15-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Promotion tournament; internal competition; worker separation; wage progression;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs

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