Does Physicians' Compensation Affect the Probability of their Vetoing Generic Substitution?
Physicians' decisions whether or not to veto generic substitution were analyzed using a sample of 350,000 pharmaceutical prescriptions. Point estimates show that - compared to county-empoyed physicians on salary - physicians working at private practices were 50-80% more likely to veto substitution. The results indicate that this difference is explained by the difference in direct cost associated with substitution, rather than by private physicians' possibly stronger incentives to please their patients. Also, the probability of a veto was found to increase as patients' copayments decreased. This might indicate moral hazard in insurance, though other exaplanations are plausible.
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|Date of creation:||04 Apr 2008|
|Publication status:||Published as Granlund, David, 'Are private physicians more likely to veto generic substitution of prescribed pharmaceuticals? ' in Social Science & Medicine, 2009, pages 1643-1650.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: HUI Research, Regeringsgatan 60, 103 29 Stockholm, Sweden|
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- Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas & Wikström, Magnus, 2004.
"Fixed Budgets as a Cost Containment Measure for Pharmaceuticals,"
Umeå Economic Studies
639, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
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Forum for Health Economics & Policy,
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- Lundin, Douglas, 2000. "Moral hazard in physician prescription behavior," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 639-662, September.
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