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Patient complexity and GPS' income under mixed remuneration

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  • K. R. Olsen

Abstract

Because of problems with recruiting GPs to deprived areas in Denmark, it has been discussed whether the mixed remuneration scheme is flexible enough to compensate GPs serving patients with high need for services. The objective is to assess how patient heterogeneity affects list size, income and total utility of GPs operating under a mixed remuneration scheme. We adapt the model by Iversen (2004) as a theoretical framework for analysing the consequences of patient heterogeneity in a mixed remuneration system. We use a data set of Danish solo practitioners to analyse the effect of patient complexity on list size and income. From the theoretical model we find that higher levels of patient complexity lead GPs to choose a lower list size, whereas the effect on income is ambiguous. The effect on total utility (income and leisure) is, however, shown to be negative. Using empirical data from 1039 solo practices we find that patient complexity reduces both list size and income and conclude that a mixed per capita and fee for service remuneration system does not fully compensate practices with more complex patients. Differentiated per capita payment may represent a means of ensuring fair and equal income of GPs. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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  • K. R. Olsen, 2012. "Patient complexity and GPS' income under mixed remuneration," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 619-632, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:21:y:2012:i:6:p:619-632
    DOI: 10.1002/hec.1731
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sørensen, Torben Højmark & Olsen, Kim Rose & Vedsted, Peter, 2009. "Association between general practice referral rates and patients' socioeconomic status and access to specialised health care: A population-based nationwide study," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(2-3), pages 180-186, October.
    2. Iversen, Tor & Luras, Hilde, 2000. "Economic motives and professional norms: the case of general medical practice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 447-470, December.
    3. Scott, Anthony, 2000. "Economics of general practice," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1175-1200, Elsevier.
    4. Iversen, Tor, 2004. "The effects of a patient shortage on general practitioners' future income and list of patients," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 673-694, July.
    5. Dusheiko, Mark & Gravelle, Hugh & Jacobs, Rowena & Smith, Peter, 2006. "The effect of financial incentives on gatekeeping doctors: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 449-478, May.
    6. Gaynor, Martin & Pauly, Mark V, 1990. "Compensation and Productive Efficiency of Partnerships: Evidence from Medical Group Practice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 544-573, June.
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    1. Kristensen, Troels & Rose Olsen, Kim & Sortsø, Camilla & Ejersted, Charlotte & Thomsen, Janus Laust & Halling, Anders, 2013. "Resources allocation and health care needs in diabetes care in Danish GP clinics," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 206-215.
    2. Olsen, Kim Rose & Kristensen, Troels, 2013. "Patient heterogeneity and income under mixed remuneration - empirical explorations of general practice partnerships," DaCHE discussion papers 2013:7, University of Southern Denmark, Dache - Danish Centre for Health Economics.
    3. Olsen, Kim Rose & Laudicella, Mauro, 2019. "Health care inequality in free access health systems: The impact of non-pecuniary incentives on diabetic patients in Danish general practices," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 230(C), pages 174-183.
    4. Christian Volmar Skovsgaard & Troels Kristensen & Ryan Pulleyblank & Kim Rose Olsen, 2023. "Increasing capitation in mixed remuneration schemes: Effects on service provision and process quality of care," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(11), pages 2477-2498, November.
    5. Shuguang Lin & Paul Rouse & Fan Zhang & Ying‐Ming Wang, 2021. "Measuring work complexity for acute care services," International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(6), pages 2199-2214, November.

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