Competition and physician behaviour: Does the competitive environment the propensity to issue sickness certificates?
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More about this item
KeywordsPhysicians; Competition; Sickness certification;
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-03-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2017-03-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EUR-2017-03-19 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-HEA-2017-03-19 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IND-2017-03-19 (Industrial Organization)
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