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Gatekeeping versus direct‐access when patient information matters

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  • Paula González

Abstract

We develop a principal‐agent model in which the health authority acts as a principal for both a patient and a general practitioner (GP). The goal of the paper is to weigh the merits of gatekeeping versus non‐gatekeeping approaches to health care when patient self‐health information and patient pressure on GPs to provide referrals for specialized care are considered. We find that, when GPs incentives matter, a non‐gatekeeping system is preferable only when (i) patient pressure to refer is sufficiently high and (ii) the quality of the patient's self‐health information is neither highly inaccurate (in which case the patient's self‐referral will be very inefficient) nor highly accurate (in which case the GP's agency problem will be very costly). Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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  • Paula González, 2010. "Gatekeeping versus direct‐access when patient information matters," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(6), pages 730-754, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:19:y:2010:i:6:p:730-754
    DOI: 10.1002/hec.1506
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    Cited by:

    1. Andriy Danyliv & Milena Pavlova & Irena Gryga & Wim Groot, 2015. "Preferences for physician services in Ukraine: a discrete choice experiment," International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 346-365, October.
    2. Brekke, Kurt R. & Holmås, Tor Helge & Monstad, Karin & Straume, Odd Rune, 2019. "Competition and physician behaviour: Does the competitive environment affect the propensity to issue sickness certificates?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 117-135.
    3. Allard, Marie & Jelovac, Izabela & Léger, Pierre Thomas, 2011. "Treatment and referral decisions under different physician payment mechanisms," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 880-893.
    4. Marie Allard & Izabela Jelovac & Pierre-Thomas Léger, 2014. "Payment mechanism and GP self-selection: capitation versus fee for service," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 143-160, June.
    5. Marie Allard & Izabela Jelovac & Pierre-Thomas Léger, 2010. "Physicians self selection of a payment mechanism: Capitation versus fee-for-service," Working Papers 1024, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    6. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Shirking Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    7. Tor Iversen & Ching-to Ma, 2011. "Market conditions and general practitioners’ referrals," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 245-265, December.
    8. Kaarboe, Oddvar & Siciliani, Luigi, 2023. "Contracts for primary and secondary care physicians and equity-efficiency trade-offs," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    9. Brekke, Kurt R. & Holmås, Tor Helge & Monstad, Karin & Straume, Odd Rune, 2017. "Competition and physician behaviour: Does the competitive environment the propensity to issue sickness certificates?," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 3/2017, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.

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