Choosing one's preferences
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsstrategic commitment; choice of preferences; Stackelberg; supermodularity;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2013-10-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-10-02 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-10-02 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2013-10-02 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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