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Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

  • Anders Poulsen

    ()

  • Michael Roos

Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments that may appear counter-intuitive. We conducted an experiment to see if people make a counter-intuitive but strategically optimal decision to avoid information. The experiment is based on a sequential Nash demand game in which a responding player can commit ahead of the game not to see what a proposing player demanded. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the optimal strategic commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-010-9236-6
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 13 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 206-225

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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:2:p:206-225
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

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