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Ownership structures and R&D in Europe: the good institutional investors, the bad and ugly impatient shareholders

  • Olivier Brossard

    ()

    (LEREPS - Laboratoire d'Etude et de Recherche sur l'Economie, les Politiques et les Systèmes Sociaux - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT2 - Université Toulouse 2 - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Toulouse - École Nationale de Formation Agronomique - ENFA)

  • Stéphanie Lavigne

    ()

    (LEREPS - Laboratoire d'Etude et de Recherche sur l'Economie, les Politiques et les Systèmes Sociaux - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT2 - Université Toulouse 2 - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Toulouse - École Nationale de Formation Agronomique - ENFA)

  • Mustafa Erdem Sakinc

    (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux 4 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

This study examines the relationship between ownership structures in large European companies and their innovative activity in terms of R&D spending. The analysis is performed on a sample of 324 large innovative companies over 8 years. Contrary to the view that institutional investors can have a negative influence on R&D spending, we report a positive impact of these investors. Our study also tests the impact of 'impatient' institutional investors and provides evidence of their negative influence on R&D spending.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Publication status: Published in Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2013, 22 (04), pp.xx-xx. <10.1093/icc/dtt018.>
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00843984
DOI: 10.1093/icc/dtt018.
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00843984
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