IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-05108116.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Political parties’ ideological bias and convergence in economic outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Zeeshan Hashim

    (Brunel University London [Uxbridge])

  • Jan Fidrmuc

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Sugata Ghosh

    (Brunel University London [Uxbridge])

Abstract

In democracies, policies are jointly shaped by voters' preferences and politicians' (or parties') ideological biases. We explore the relative importance of the latter on some key economic outcomes – growth rate, inflation and inequality – in a broad sample of 71 democracies from 1995 to 2019. We find evidence that both left-wing and right-wing governments deliver convergent outcomes as regards growth, inflation and inequality. The same applies to the policy outcome of economic freedom. This indicates that consolidated democracies maintain continuity in economic policies, and a change in government from one political ideology to another with a different ideology does not significantly alter economic policy outcomes. However, we find divergence in hybrid regimes; inequality and economic freedom are reduced under leftist governments, and economic freedom is enhanced by rightist governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Zeeshan Hashim & Jan Fidrmuc & Sugata Ghosh, 2025. "Political parties’ ideological bias and convergence in economic outcomes," Post-Print hal-05108116, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05108116
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102669
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sharun W Mukand & Dani Rodrik, 2020. "The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(627), pages 765-792.
    2. Eric J. Brunner & Stephen L. Ross, 2009. "Is the Median Voter Decisive? Evidence of 'Ends Against the Middle' From Referenda Voting Patterns," Working papers 2009-02, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised May 2010.
    3. Hibbs, Douglas A., 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1467-1487, December.
    4. Robert M. Solow, 1956. "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 70(1), pages 65-94.
    5. Volkerink, Bjorn & De Haan, Jakob, 2001. "Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(3-4), pages 221-242, December.
    6. Francesco Scervini, 2012. "Empirics of the median voter: democracy, redistribution and the role of the middle class," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 10(4), pages 529-550, December.
    7. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    8. Brunner, Eric J. & Ross, Stephen L., 2010. "Is the median voter decisive? Evidence from referenda voting patterns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 898-910, December.
    9. Joshua C. Hall & Robert A. Lawson, 2014. "Economic Freedom Of The World: An Accounting Of The Literature," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(1), pages 1-19, January.
    10. James D. Gwartney & Robert A. Lawson & Randall G. Holcombe, 1999. "Economic Freedom and the Environment for Economic Growth," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(4), pages 643-643, December.
    11. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    12. Doucouliagos, Chris & Ulubasoglu, Mehmet Ali, 2006. "Economic freedom and economic growth: Does specification make a difference?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 60-81, March.
    13. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, December.
    14. Stefanie Stantcheva, 2024. "Why Do We Dislike Inflation?," NBER Working Papers 32300, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Manuel Funke & Moritz Schularick & Christoph Trebesch, 2023. "Populist Leaders and the Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(12), pages 3249-3288, December.
    16. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    17. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    18. Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 155-179, January.
    19. Druckman, James N. & Peterson, Erik & Slothuus, Rune, 2013. "How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(1), pages 57-79, February.
    20. Bullock, John G. & Gerber, Alan S. & Hill, Seth J. & Huber, Gregory A., 2015. "Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 519-578, December.
    21. Alberto Alesina & Armando Miano & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2020. "The Polarization of Reality," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 110, pages 324-328, May.
    22. Stefanie Stantcheva, 2024. "Why Do We Dislike Inflation?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 55(1 (Spring), pages 1-65.
    23. Robert J. Barro, 1998. "Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522543, December.
    24. Andreas Bergh & Martin Karlsson, 2010. "Government size and growth: Accounting for economic freedom and globalization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 195-213, January.
    25. Lucy Barnes, 2013. "Does Median Voter Income Matter? The Effects of Inequality and Turnout on Government Spending," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 61(1), pages 82-100, March.
    26. Niklas Potrafke, 2010. "Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 146(3), pages 545-571, September.
    27. Bernhard, William & Leblang, David, 2002. "Political Parties and Monetary Commitments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 803-830, October.
    28. Cowen, Tyler & Sutter, Daniel, 1998. "Why Only Nixon Could Go to China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 605-615, December.
    29. David L. Epstein & Robert Bates & Jack Goldstone & Ida Kristensen & Sharyn O'Halloran, 2006. "Democratic Transitions," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 551-569, July.
      • David Epstein & Robert H. Bates & Jack Goldstone & Ida Kristensen & Sharyn O'Halloran, 2004. "Democratic Transitions," CID Working Papers 101, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    30. Niklas Potrafke, 2010. "Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 135-155, April.
    31. Christian Bjørnskov, 2005. "Does Political Ideology Affect Economic Growth?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 133-146, April.
    32. repec:aei:rpbook:24898 is not listed on IDEAS
    33. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    34. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Jeffrey B. Lewis, 2004. "Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(6), pages 1364-1383, December.
    35. Castro, Vítor & Martins, Rodrigo, 2021. "Government ideology and economic freedom," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 73-91.
    36. J. Stephen Ferris & Marcel-Cristian Voia, 2011. "Does the expectation or realization of a federal election precipitate Canadian output growth?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(1), pages 107-132, February.
    37. Johan Graafland & Bjorn Lous, 2018. "Economic Freedom, Income Inequality and Life Satisfaction in OECD Countries," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 19(7), pages 2071-2093, October.
    38. Magnus Henrekson & Andreas Bergh, 2010. "Government Size and Implications for Economic Growth," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 50388, September.
    39. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
    40. Kai Jäger, 2017. "Economic Freedom in the Early 21st Century: Government Ideology Still Matters," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 256-277, May.
    41. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. & Nadeau, Richard & Foucault, Martial, 2013. "The Compleat Economic Voter: New Theory and British Evidence," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 241-261, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Potrafke, Niklas, 2017. "Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 712-750.
    2. Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 155-179, January.
    3. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political Ideology and Economic Freedom Across Canadian Provinces," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 143-166.
    4. Mechtel, Mario & Potrafke, Niklas, 2009. "Political Cycles in Active Labor Market Policies," MPRA Paper 14270, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    6. Potrafke, Niklas, 2010. "The growth of public health expenditures in OECD countries: Do government ideology and electoral motives matter?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 797-810, December.
    7. Huynh, Tran & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2024. "Early warning models for systemic banking crises: Can political indicators improve prediction?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    8. Niklas Potrafke, 2011. "Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 101-134, June.
    9. Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 631-651, September.
    10. Elinder, Mikael & Jordahl, Henrik & Poutvaara, Panu, 2015. "Promises, policies and pocketbook voting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 177-194.
    11. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2004. "Bad politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 759-782, March.
    12. Vergne, Clémence, 2009. "Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 63-77, March.
    13. Manuela Krause, 2019. "Communal fees and election cycles: Evidence from German municipalities," ifo Working Paper Series 293, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    14. Osterloh, Steffen, 2012. "Words speak louder than actions: The impact of politics on economic performance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 318-336.
    15. Bove, Vincenzo & Efthyvoulou, Georgios & Navas, Antonio, 2017. "Political cycles in public expenditure: butter vs guns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 582-604.
    16. Fuest, Clemens & Gründler, Klaus & Potrafke, Niklas & Ruthardt, Fabian, 2024. "Read my lips? Taxes and elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    17. Vitor Castro, 2016. "Shades of red and blue: Political ideology and sustainable development," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 3606234, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
    18. Castro, Vítor & Martins, Rodrigo, 2021. "Government ideology and economic freedom," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 73-91.
    19. Mario Mechtel & Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Electoral cycles in active labor market policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 181-194, July.
    20. Georgios Efthyvoulou, 2012. "Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 295-327, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05108116. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.