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Net Neutrality Debate: Impact of Competition among ISPs

  • François Boussion

    (ENS - Ecole Normale Supérieure [Paris 14e] - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche)

  • Patrick Maillé


    (RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom)

  • Bruno Tuffin

    (DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS - Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique - INRIA - IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES - IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - INRIA - SUPELEC - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Télécom Bretagne - CNRS)

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    Network neutrality has recently been the topic of an important debate, in both the telecommunication and political worlds, because of its potential impact in every-day life. While there has been many studies discussing the advantages and drawbacks of neutrality, there is no game-theoretical study dealing with the observable situation of competitive ISPs in front of a (quasi-)monopolistic content provider (CP), while it is a complaint from ISPs, and an illustration of the non-neutrality need. This paper provides a first game-theoretical analysis of relations between two competitive ISPs and a single CP, in the form of a four-level game, played at different time scales. This game is analyzed by backward induction. We show that while the complaint from ISPs is relevant with a such a competitive model, inserting side payments does not solve the problem.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00725489.

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    Date of creation: 03 Jan 2012
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in COMSNETS 2012: 4th International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks, Jan 2012, Bangalore, India. pp.1-8, 2012
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00725489
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    1. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
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