Two Examples of Equilibrium Nonexistence
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DOI: 10.1515/mel-2013-0018
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; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- N01 - Economic History - - General - - - Development of the Discipline: Historiographical; Sources and Methods
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