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Impact on retail prices of non-neutral wholesale prices for content providers

  • Giuseppe D'Acquisto

    (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali [Rome] - Garante per la protezione dei dati personali)

  • Patrick Maillé

    ()

    (RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom)

  • Maurizio Naldi

    (DISP - Dipartimento di Informatica, Sistemi e Produzione [Roma] - Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata")

  • Bruno Tuffin

    (DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS - Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique - INRIA - IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES - IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - INRIA - SUPELEC - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Télécom Bretagne - CNRS)

The impact of wholesale prices is examined in a context where the end customer access both free content and payper-use content, delivered by two different providers through a common network provider. We formulate and solve the game between the network provider and the pay-per-use content provider, where both use the price they separately charge the end customer with as a leverage to maximize their profits. In the neutral case (the network provider charges equal wholesale prices to the two content providers), the benefits coming from wholesale price reductions are largely retained by the pay-peruse content provider. When the free content provider is charged more than its pay-per-use competitor, both the network provider and the pay-per-use content provider see their profit increase, while the end customer experiences a negligible reduction in the retail price.

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Date of creation: 25 Jun 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00725050
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00725050
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  1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
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