Impact on retail prices of non-neutral wholesale prices for content providers
The impact of wholesale prices is examined in a context where the end customer access both free content and payper-use content, delivered by two different providers through a common network provider. We formulate and solve the game between the network provider and the pay-per-use content provider, where both use the price they separately charge the end customer with as a leverage to maximize their proﬁts. In the neutral case (the network provider charges equal wholesale prices to the two content providers), the beneﬁts coming from wholesale price reductions are largely retained by the pay-peruse content provider. When the free content provider is charged more than its pay-per-use competitor, both the network provider and the pay-per-use content provider see their proﬁt increase, while the end customer experiences a negligible reduction in the retail price.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published - Presented, NGI 2012: 8th Euro-NF Conference on Next Generation Internet, 2012, Karlskrona, Sweden|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00725050|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00725050. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.