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Evaluating Rent Dissipation in the Spanish Football Industry

  • Guido Ascari

    (Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods - University of Pavia, Italy)

  • Philippe Gagnepain

    ()

    (Departamento de Economía - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

This article proposes to evaluate empirically the consequences of the rent-seeking behavior of football clubs on their costs. The empirical work entails estimating a football wage, result, and demand system with data on clubs competing in the first and second Spanish leagues during the 1996-2003 seasons. The estimation sheds light on wage distortions that differ from 45% to 52% throughout the period considered. This provides an interesting illustration of the financial difficulties faced recently by many European football clubs.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00622841.

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Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Journal of Sports Economics, 2007, 8, 468-490
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00622841
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00622841/en/
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  1. Sloane, Peter J, 1971. "The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as a Utility Maximiser," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 18(2), pages 121-46, June.
  2. Stefan Szymanski, 2000. "A Market Test for Discrimination in the English Professional Soccer Leagues," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 590-603, June.
  3. Stefan Szymanski & Ron Smith, 1997. "The English Football Industry: profit, performance and industrial structure," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 135-153.
  4. Clark, Derek J. & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 605-625, November.
  5. Stein, William E, 2002. " Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 325-36, December.
  6. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. " Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-30, March.
  7. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Richard Hofler & James Payne, 1996. "How close to their offensive potential do national football league teams play?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(11), pages 743-747.
  9. Szymanski, Stefan & Valletti, Tommaso, 2004. "First and Second Prizes in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 4484, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Battese, George E. & Coelli, Tim J., 1988. "Prediction of firm-level technical efficiencies with a generalized frontier production function and panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 387-399, July.
  11. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1996. " A Multi-winner Nested Rent-Seeking Contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 177-84, April.
  12. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521517140 is not listed on IDEAS
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