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Wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken. An explorative experimental study

  • Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin

    ()

    (CREAM - Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée à la Mondialisation - Université de Rouen : EA4702)

  • Nathalie Etchart-Vincent

    ()

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

In this short paper, we run an experiment to investigate the influence of a very basic change in the labelling of the strategies on cooperative behaviour in a standard Game of Chicken. Our between-subject experimental design involves two treatments. The only difference between them is that we introduce either a socially-oriented wording ('I cooperate'/'I do not cooperate') or colours (Red/Blue) to designate strategies. Our study replicates the findings obtained in a previous experimental study based on a Game of Chicken framework with incomplete information and a within-subject design: the level of cooperation appears to be higher in the socially-oriented context, due to a change in women behaviour only.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number hal-00796708.

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Date of creation: 04 Mar 2013
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00796708
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  1. Andreoni, James & Vesterlund, Lise, 2001. "Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism," Staff General Research Papers 1951, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Cooperation: The Power Of A Single Word? Some Experimental Evidence On Wording And Gender Effects In A Game Of Chicken," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 43-64, 01.
  3. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2011. "Cooperation: the power of a single word? Some experimental evidence on wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00741973, HAL.
  4. Boffa, Mauro & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2012. "Protectionism during the crisis: Tit-for-tat or chicken-games?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 746-749.
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  6. Cason, Timothy N. & Sharma, Tridib, 2006. "Recommended Play and Correlated Equilibria: An Experimental Study," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1191, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
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  8. Zizzo, Daniel John & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2007. "Perceived harmony, similarity and cooperation in 2 x 2 games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 365-386, June.
  9. Neugebauer, Tibor & Poulsen, Anders & Schram, Arthur, 2008. "Fairness and reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 243-250, May.
  10. Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 1998. "Are Women Less Selfish Than Men? Evidence from Dictator Experiments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 726-35, May.
  11. Butler, David J. & Burbank, Victoria K. & Chisholm, James S., 2011. "The frames behind the games: Player's perceptions of prisoners dilemma, chicken, dictator, and ultimatum games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 103-114, April.
  12. Brian Skyrms & Kevin J.S. Zollman, 2010. "Evolutionary considerations in the framing of social norms," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 9(3), pages 265-273, August.
  13. Joerg Oechssler, 1994. "An Evolutionary Interpretation Of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria," Game Theory and Information 9404001, EconWPA.
  14. Rege, Mari & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1625-1644, July.
  15. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Mollerstrom, Johanna & Munkhammar, Sara, 2012. "Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 117-130.
  16. Chaudhuri, Ananish & Sopher, Barry & Strand, Paul, 2002. "Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 231-249, April.
  17. Biel, Anders & Thogersen, John, 2007. "Activation of social norms in social dilemmas: A review of the evidence and reflections on the implications for environmental behaviour," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 93-112, January.
  18. Koji Kotani & Shunsuke Managi & Kenta Tanaka, 2008. "Further investigations of framing effects on cooperative choices in a provision point mechanism," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(51), pages 1-9.
  19. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:51:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
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