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Endogenous Financial and Trade Openness: Efficiency and Political Economy Considerations

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua Aizenman

    (Department of Economics, University of California at Santa Cruz
    NBER)

  • Ilan Noy

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

Abstract

This paper studies the endogenous determination of financial and trade openness. We outline a framework where financial openness is endogenously determined by the authority’s choice of financial repression as a taxation device, and where the private sector determines endogenously the magnitude of capital flight. The optimal financial repression is shown to depend on the openness of the economy to international trade, the efficiency of the tax system (which in turn may be affected by political economy considerations). Similar predictions are obtained in a model where authorities pursue an opportunistic policy representing the interest of a narrow pressure group that engages in capital flight due to political uncertainty. Both models predict that larger trade openness would induce greater financial openness. The reverse association -- larger financial openness implies greater trade openness -- may hold due to different channels that are briefly discussed. Hence, we expect to find two-way positive linkages between financial and commercial openness. We confirm these predictions empirically. Having established (Granger) causality, we investigate the relative magnitudes of these directions of causality using the decomposition test developed in Geweke (1982). We find that almost all of the linear feedback between trade and financial openness can be accounted for by G-causality from financial openness to trade openness (53%) and from trade to financial openness (34%). The residual is due to simultaneous correlation between the two measures. In our estimations for the determinants of financial openness, we focus on developing countries and examine a host of macro-economic and political-institutional variables as suggested in our theory. We find that a one standard deviation increase in commercial openness is associated with a 9.5 percent increase in de-facto financial openness (% of GDP), a one standard deviation increase in a democratization index reduces financial openness by 3.5%, and a one standard deviation increase in corruption is associated with a 3% reduction of financial openness. Similar negative dependence applies for measures of political competition. The impact of a budget surplus on financial openness is negative for developing countries, but positive for the OECD. Both the theoretical and empirical analyses lead us to the conclude, counter-intuitively, that a more openly competitive, free and inclusive political system will lead to lower levels of de-facto financial openness.This paper studies the endogenous determination of financial and trade openness. We outline a framework where financial openness is endogenously determined by the authority’s choice of financial repression as a taxation device, and where the private sector determines endogenously the magnitude of capital flight. The optimal financial repression is shown to depend on the openness of the economy to international trade, the efficiency of the tax system (which in turn may be affected by political economy considerations). Similar predictions are obtained in a model where authorities pursue an opportunistic policy representing the interest of a narrow pressure group that engages in capital flight due to political uncertainty. Both models predict that larger trade openness would induce greater financial openness. The reverse association -- larger financial openness implies greater trade openness -- may hold due to different channels that are briefly discussed. Hence, we expect to find two-way positive linkages between financial and commercial openness. We confirm these predictions empirically. Having established (Granger) causality, we investigate the relative magnitudes of these directions of causality using the decomposition test developed in Geweke (1982). We find that almost all of the linear feedback between trade and financial openness can be accounted for by G-causality from financial openness to trade openness (53%) and from trade to financial openness (34%). The residual is due to simultaneous correlation between the two measures. In our estimations for the determinants of financial openness, we focus on developing countries and examine a host of macro-economic and political-institutional variables as suggested in our theory. We find that a one standard deviation increase in commercial openness is associated with a 9.5 percent increase in de-facto financial openness (% of GDP), a one standard deviation increase in a democratization index reduces financial openness by 3.5%, and a one standard deviation increase in corruption is associated with a 3% reduction of financial openness. Similar negative dependence applies for measures of political competition. The impact of a budget surplus on financial openness is negative for developing countries, but positive for the OECD. Both the theoretical and empirical analyses lead us to the conclude, counter-intuitively, that a more openly competitive, free and inclusive political system will lead to lower levels of de-facto financial openness.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Aizenman & Ilan Noy, 2004. "Endogenous Financial and Trade Openness: Efficiency and Political Economy Considerations," Working Papers 200404, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:200404
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua Aizenman, 2005. "Financial Liberalisations in Latin America in the 1990s: A Reassessment," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(7), pages 959-983, July.
    2. Franco Ruzzenenti & Andreas Joseph & Elisa Ticci & Pietro Vozzella & Giampaolo Gabbi, 2015. "Interactions between Financial and Environmental Networks in OECD Countries," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(9), pages 1-12, September.
    3. Coeurdacier, Nicolas, 2009. "Do trade costs in goods market lead to home bias in equities?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 86-100, February.
    4. Aizenman, Joshua & Noy, Ilan, 2006. "FDI and trade--Two-way linkages?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 317-337, July.
    5. Braun, Matias, 2004. "Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Financial Development," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt70v7f9ff, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    6. Bekaert, Geert & Harvey, Campbell R. & Lundblad, Christian, 2006. "Growth volatility and financial liberalization," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 370-403, April.
    7. Eicher, Theo S. & Helfman, Lindy & Lenkoski, Alex, 2012. "Robust FDI determinants: Bayesian Model Averaging in the presence of selection bias," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 637-651.
    8. Shin, Kwanho & Yang, Doo Yong, 2006. "Complementarity between Bilateral Trade and Financial Integration," MPRA Paper 694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Joshua Aizenman & Ilan Noy, 2008. "Links between Trade and Finance: A Disaggregated Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 9-28, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Chinn, Menzie D. & Ito, Hiro, 2006. "What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and interactions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 163-192, October.
    11. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    12. Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak, 2008. "The collection efficiency of the Value Added Tax: Theory and international evidence," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 391-410.
    13. Maria Kazakova & Alexandr Knobel & Ilya Sokolov, 2010. "Quality of VAT administration in OECD countries and Russia. Reform of the Russian system of tax collection," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 134P.
    14. Braun, Matias & Raddatz, Claudio, 2007. "Trade liberalization, capital account liberalization and the real effects of financial development," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 730-761, September.
    15. Rana Ejaz Ali Khan & Qazi Muhammad Adnan Hye, 2014. "Foreign direct investment and liberalization policies in Pakistan: An empirical analysis," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 1-12, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial openness; trade openness; financial repression; political competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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