Food trade policy and food price volatility

Food trade barriers in many countries are systematically adjusted to insulate domestic markets from world price changes—a response not predicted by traditional political economy models. In this study, policymakers are assumed to minimize the political costs associated with changing domestic prices and deviating from longer-run political-economy equilibria. Error correction techniques applied to domestic and world price data for rice and wheat collected to measure trade policy distortions allow estimation of policy response parameters. The results suggest that systematic short-run price insulation reduces shocks to domestic prices but sharply increases world price volatility and the costs of trade distortions. However, idiosyncratic domestic price shocks resulting from inefficient policy instruments such as quantitative restrictions increase domestic price volatility relative to the magnified volatility of world prices—frequently outweighing the stabilizing impacts of price insulation. This fundamentally changes our understanding of the impacts of price-insulation—from a zero-sum game where some countries reduce the volatility of their prices using beggar-thy-neighbor policies that raise price volatility elsewhere, into one where price volatility rises in most countries. National policy reforms to move away from discretionary, destabilizing policies could lower costs, reduce volatility in domestic and world prices, and facilitate reform of international trade rules.