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Private Information in Over-the-Counter Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Zachary Bethune
  • Bruno Sultanum
  • Nicholas Trachter

Abstract

We study trading in over-the-counter (OTC) markets where agents have heterogeneous and private valuations for assets. We develop a quantitative model in which assets are issued through a primary market and then traded in a secondary OTC market. Then we use data on the US municipal bond market to calibrate the model. We find that the effects of private information are large, reducing asset supply by 20%, trade volume by 80%, and aggregate welfare by 8%. Using the model, we identify two channels through which the information friction harms the economy. First, the distribution of the existing stock of assets is inefficient because some of the efficient trades, which should occur, do not. Second, the total stock of assets is inefficiently low because resale value and liquidity go down due to the information friction. We investigate how much a simple tax/subsidy scheme that spurs issuance of new assets can help mitigate the cost associated with private information and find that it lowers the welfare cost from 8% to approximately 1%.

Suggested Citation

  • Zachary Bethune & Bruno Sultanum & Nicholas Trachter, 2016. "Private Information in Over-the-Counter Markets," Working Paper 16-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:16-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chung-Yi Tse & Yujing Xu, 2021. "Inter-Dealer Trades in OTC Markets - Who Buys and Who Sells?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 39, pages 220-257, January.
    2. Julian Kozlowski, 2021. "Long-Term Finance and Investment with Frictional Asset Markets," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 411-448, October.
    3. Zachary Bethune & Bruno Sultanum & Nicholas Trachter, 2019. "Asset Issuance in Over-the-Counter Markets," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 4-29, July.
    4. Julien Hugonnier & Benjamin Lester & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2020. "Frictional Intermediation in Over-the-Counter Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 1432-1469.
    5. Sultanum, Bruno, 2018. "Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 616-658.
    6. Athanasios Geromichalos & Kuk Mo Jung & Seungduck Lee & Dillon Carlos, 2019. "Asset Liquidity in Monetary Theory and Finance: A Unified Approach," Working Papers 1905, Research Institute for Market Economy, Sogang University.
    7. Julian Kozlowski, 2017. "Long-Term Finance and Economic Development: The Role of Liquidity in Corporate Debt Markets," 2017 Meeting Papers 699, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Geromichalos, Athanasios & Jung, Kuk Mo & Lee, Seungduck & Carlos, Dillon, 2021. "A model of endogenous direct and indirect asset liquidity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decentralized markets; bilateral trade; asset issuance; liquidity; asymmetric information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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