Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market
Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealer markets in which price information is costly to gather. Whether dealers in such a market operate competitively is an empirical issue, but a difficult one to study. Data in such markets is generally not centrally recorded. We analyze a comprehensive database of all trades between broker-dealers in municipal bonds and their customers. The data is only released to the public with a substancial lag, and thus the market was relativela opaque to the traders themselves during our sample period. We find that dealers earn lower average markups on larger trades, even though larger trades lead the dealers to bear more risk of losses. We formulate and estimate a simple structural bargaining model that allows us to estimate mesures of dealer bargaining power and it relate it to the characteristics of the trades. The results suggest dealers exercise substancial market power. Our mesures of market power decrease in trade size and increase in variables that indicate the complexity of the trade for the dealer.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 41 22 / 312 09 61
Fax: 41 22 / 312 10 26
Web page: http://www.swissfinanceinstitute.ch
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521666633 is not listed on IDEAS
- Aigner, Dennis & Lovell, C. A. Knox & Schmidt, Peter, 1977. "Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier production function models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 21-37, July.
- Green, Richard C, 1993. "A Simple Model of the Taxable and Tax-Exempt Yield Curves," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(2), pages 233-64.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fam:rpseri:rp130. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marilyn Barja)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.