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Liquidity Regulation and Financial Intermediaries

Author

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  • Marco Macchiavelli
  • Luke Pettit

Abstract

We document several effects of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) rule on dealers' financing and intermediation of securities. For identification, we exploit the fact that the US implementation is more stringent than that in foreign jurisdictions. In line with LCR incentives, US dealers reduce their reliance on repos as a way to finance inventories of high-quality assets and increase the maturity of lower-quality repos relative to foreign dealers; additionally, US dealers cut back on trades that downgrade their own collateral. Dealers are nevertheless still providing significant maturity transformation. We also show that significant de-risking occurs immediately after the 2007-09 crisis, before post-crisis regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Macchiavelli & Luke Pettit, 2018. "Liquidity Regulation and Financial Intermediaries," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-084, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2018-84
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2018.084
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    File URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018084pap.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rajkamal Iyer & Marco Macchiavelli, 2017. "Primary Dealers' Behavior during the 2007-08 Crisis : Part I, Repo Runs," FEDS Notes 2017-06-22-1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Mark A. Carlson & Marco Macchiavelli, 2018. "Emergency Collateral Upgrades," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-078, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Adrian, Tobias & Boyarchenko, Nina & Shachar, Or, 2017. "Dealer balance sheets and bond liquidity provision," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 92-109.
    4. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
    5. Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin & Michael Walker, 2014. "Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2343-2380, December.
    6. Mike Anderson & René M. Stulz, 2017. "Is Post-Crisis Bond Liquidity Lower?," NBER Working Papers 23317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Thomas Keating & Marco Macchiavelli, 2017. "Interest on Reserves and Arbitrage in Post-Crisis Money Markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-124, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Acharya, Viral V. & Fleming, Michael J. & Hrung, Warren B. & Sarkar, Asani, 2017. "Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 81-107.
    9. Dick-Nielsen, Jens & Feldhütter, Peter & Lando, David, 2012. "Corporate bond liquidity before and after the onset of the subprime crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(3), pages 471-492.
    10. Jack Bao & Maureen O'Hara & Xing Zhou, 2016. "The Volcker Rule and Market-Making in Times of Stress," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-102, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Basel III; Broker-dealers; Liquidity coverage ratio; Repurchase agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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