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Gates, Fees, and Preemptive Runs

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Cipriani
  • Antoine Martin
  • Patrick E. McCabe
  • Bruno Parigi

Abstract

We build a model of a financial intermediary, in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and show that allowing the intermediary to impose redemption fees or gates in a crisis--a form of suspension of convertibility--can lead to preemptive runs. In our model, a fraction of investors (depositors) can become informed about a shock to the return of the intermediary's assets. Later, the informed investors learn the realization of the shock and can choose their redemption behavior based on this information. We prove two results: First, there are situations in which informed investors would wait until the uncertainty is resolved before redeeming if redemption fees or gates cannot be imposed, but those same investors would redeem preemptively, if fees or gates are possible. Second, we show that for the intermediary, which maximizes expected utility of only its own investors, imposing gates or fees can be ex post optimal. These results have important policy implications for intermediaries that are vulnerable to runs, such as money market funds, because the preemptive runs that can be caused by the possibility of gates or fees may have damaging negative externalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Cipriani & Antoine Martin & Patrick E. McCabe & Bruno Parigi, 2014. "Gates, Fees, and Preemptive Runs," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-30, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2014-30
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gorton, Gary B., 2012. "Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See Them Coming," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199922901.
    2. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2009. "Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1588-1607, September.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    4. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Bank suspension of convertibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 177-193, March.
    5. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2010. "Banking panics and policy responses," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 404-419, May.
    6. Engineer, Merwan, 1989. "Bank runs and the suspension of deposit convertibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 443-454, November.
    7. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
    8. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2010. "Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility," NBER Chapters, in: Market Institutions and Financial Market Risk, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. An Open Letter to Bill McNabb, CEO of Vanguard Group
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2015-05-11 17:26:54
    2. 'An Open Letter to Bill McNabb, CEO of Vanguard Group'
      by Mark Thoma in Economist's View on 2015-05-11 16:06:21

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    Cited by:

    1. Josh Frost & Lorie Logan & Antoine Martin & Patrick E. McCabe & Fabio M. Natalucci & Julie Remache, 2015. "Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary Policy Tool: Some Design Considerations," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-10, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Jeffrey N. Gordon, 2014. "The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(S2), pages 351-378.
    3. Nathan Foley-Fisher & Borghan Narajabad & Stéphane Verani, 2020. "Self-Fulfilling Runs: Evidence from the US Life Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(9), pages 3520-3569.
    4. Marco Cipriani & Gabriele La Spada, 2020. "Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Runs," Staff Reports 956, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2016. "Deposit insurance and bank liquidation without commitment: Can we sleep well?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 365-392, February.
    6. Dunhong Jin & Marcin Kacperczyk & Bige Kahraman & Felix Suntheim, 2019. "Swing Pricing and Fragility in Open-end Mutual Funds," IMF Working Papers 2019/227, International Monetary Fund.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks; money market funds; runs; preemptive runs; gates; fees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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