Competition for Local Public Services with Learning-by-doing and Transferability
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012.
"Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing,"
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- Klenio Barbosa & Pierre Boyer, 2016. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," Working Papers 2016-37, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
More about this item
KeywordsSequential Auction; Public versus Private Firms; Learning-by-doing; Transferability of Learning;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-09-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2011-09-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PBE-2011-09-22 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2011-09-22 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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