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The impact of compulsory competitive tendering on refuse collection services


  • Stefan Szymanski


Compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) of blue-collar services such as refuse collection and street cleaning was introduced in the UK by the Local Government Act 1988. This law, imposed by central government, obliged elected local authorities to expose specific services to competitive tendering at fixed intervals and subject to national guidelines. Whilst the issue of competitive tendering of public services has generated a substantial literature over recent years (see Domberger and Rimmer (1994) for a review), there have been relatively few studies of compulsory competitive tendering.2 This paper uses a dataset on refuse collection costs and services for the 365 English local authorities over the period 1984-94. It follows on from Szymanski and Wilkins (1993) who analysed the same database using data up until 1988

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  • Stefan Szymanski, 1996. "The impact of compulsory competitive tendering on refuse collection services," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 1-19, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ifs:fistud:v:17:y:1996:i:3:p:1-19

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    1. Domberger, Simon & Hall, Christine & Li, Eric Ah Lik, 1995. "The Determinants of Price and Quality in Competitively Tendered Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(433), pages 1454-1470, November.
    2. Robin Milne & Magnus McGee, 1992. "Compulsory competitive tendering in the NHS: a new look at some old estimates," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 96-111, August.
    3. Stevens, Barbara J, 1978. "Scale, Market Structure, and the Cost of Refuse Collection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(3), pages 438-448, August.
    4. John Cubbin & Simon Domberger & Shirley Meadowcroft, 1987. "Competitive tendering and refuse collection: identifying the sources of efficiency gains," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 49-58, August.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-937, October.
    6. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
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