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Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Jan U. Auerbach

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)

  • Miguel A. Fonseca

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)

Abstract

We propose a procedural rule that we refer to as preordered service to replace sequential service of civil cases for breach of contract. The judiciary preannounces a list that ranks all entities that may enter contracts by some uniquely identifying information, such as taxpayer numbers. Courts use this list to enforce the contracts of the highest ranked entities that file a contract case. In theory, unlike sequential service, preordered service ensures efficiency in a population of investment games. Results from a laboratory experiment suggest that it may substantially reduce the caseload at courts and mitigate payoff inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan U. Auerbach & Miguel A. Fonseca, 2017. "Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement," Discussion Papers 1704, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:1704
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    File URL: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/RePEc/dpapers/DP1704.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Judicial system; courts; judiciary performance; legal procedure; civil cases; caseload; contract enforcement; population of investment games; experiments.;

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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